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THE RIGHTS OF A COPYRIGHT OWNER
Why should there be any protection afforded the copyright
owner? The answer to this question is predicated upon the
basic concepts which go to make up our American way of
life. The principles of our American government are found
in the Declaration of Independence which is the creed of
Americanism.1 The Constitution of the United States pro-
vides for the mechanics for carrying into effect these prin-
ciples of our government.2 Pursuant to these basic principles,
the framers of the federal constitution realized that individ-
ual genius should be protected, and consequently Congress
was given the power,
"To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for
a limited time to authors and inventors, the exclusive right to their
respective writings and discoveries." 3
The right of Congress to protect authors and inventors as set
forth in the Constitution of the United States is thus the
means by which the rights of these individuals is protected.
By and large, then, the right of a copyright holder to certain
protections is entrenched in the principles of Americanism.
The purpose of this treatise is to evaluate the extent to
which the copyright owner is protected under the American
form of government. This evaluation necessarily concerns
the right of the persons and entities to acquire a statutory
copyright, and the rights and limitations of the statutory
copyright owner to make assignments, licenses, and con-
tracts. However, first it may be well to point out some of the
distinctions which exist between the common law copyright
and statutory copyright.
1 "We hold these truths to be self-evident; that all men are created equal;
that they art endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among
these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that to secure these rights,
governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the con-
sent of the governed. .. ."
2 Clarence E. Manion, Lessons in Liberty, pp. 1-110 (1939) ; Desvernine, Creed
of Americanism, 17 N. D. L. No. 3 (1942).
8 Constitution of U. S., Art. 1, § 8, Cl. 8.
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COMMON LAW AND STATUTORY COPYRIGHT
Common Law Copyright
It has been a common error among many laymen in think-
ing that the only protection afforded an author is the statu-
tory protection created by Congress. Among the English
speaking peoples, there has always been a respect shown for
the creative genius of an individual. The courts of the United
States and England have been consistent in affording cer-
tain protection to authors even though the products of their
endeavor are not protected by the copyright statute.
At the common law the author or proprietor has a prop-
erty interest in his work.' This common law right is perpet-
ual so long as his work is not published or dedicated to the
public. However, as soon as one publishes his work, he is
said to have dedicated it to the public and thereafter no fur-
ther protection is afforded the common law copyright own-
er.' Certain problems have arisen, however, in regard to what
constitutes a publication. It is possible for the author or pro-
prietor to put certain restrictions on his publication, but it
is ultimately for the courts to decide whether or not the
restrictions are sufficient to negative a general publication.
The courts have recognized certain degrees of publication.
By and large publication has been divided into general and
limited. In a limited publication the author or proprietor's
publication is so restricted that it is evident from the condi-
tions imposed that the author does not intend to dedicate
his work to the public as contrasted to a general publication
where the acts and intent of the owner show an intention of
dedication of the work to the public. Thus, in the case of
Werckmeister v. American Lithographic Company " it was
held that where pictures were exhibited at the Royal Acad-
emy with an understanding with the Academy that no copy
4 Carl W. Doozan, Pre-Copyright Rights, 14 N. D. L. p. 391 (1939).
5 National Picture Theaters v. Foundation Film Corp., 266 F. 208 (1920).
6 Press Pub. Co. v. Monroe, 73 F. 196 (1896).
7 134 F. 321 (1904).
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or notes would be allowed while on exhibition, and it had
been a practice among authors to so exhibit pictures without
a copyright, the exhibition was merely a limited publication
and the common law rights had not been extinguished. Like-
wise, in the case of Waring v. W. D. A. S. Broadcasting Com-
pany 8 the court found that the label which was put on
phonograph records, "Not licensed for radio broadcasting"
amounted to a limited license and protection was granted.
It has, also, been held that lectures given before the public
amount only to a limited publication and the lecture had not
been dedicated to the public.9 In a recent case,'" the court
ruled that an exhibition of a jungle film, taken by the presi-
dent of a corporation, to an employee group free of charge
did not amount to a general publication and the owner could
recover for infringement. However, where an architect drew
up specifications for a customer and filed them with the
building inspector such a deposit in a public office amounts
to a dedication to the public or general publication and all
common law rights cease. 1
In the main, where a property right is sought to be pro-
tected at common law, it is the intent of the owner or pro-
prietor manifested by his overt acts and expressed intent
which denotes whether or not a general publication has been
effected. This point is illustrated in the case of the Pitts-
burgh Athletic Company v. K. Q. V. Broadcasting Com-
pany. 2 In this case, the plaintiff, a Pittsburgh baseball club
sold the exclusive broadcasting rights to the General Mills
Company. The court held that there was a property right in
these broadcasts which had been sold to the General Mills
Company and the selling of this right did not amount to a
general publication, thus the defendant who had been broad-
casting without authority could be enjoined from continuing
8 327 Pa. 433, 194 A. 631 (1937).
9 Nutt v. Nat. Inst. Inc., 31 F. 2d 236 (1929).
10 Patterson -4. Century Prod., 93 F. 2d 489 (1938).
11 Wright v. Eisle, 83 N. Y. S. 887 (1903).
12 24 F. Supp. 490 (1938).
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his broadcasting. The court said that the plaintiff had an in-
terest in the broadcast of the baseball games and the plain-
tiff's contract with the General Mills Company shows an in-
tent to preserve these rights rather than to make a dedication
to the public.
Generally, one might say that where a common law copy-
right is sought to be protected the copyright owner must be
able to show that there has been no general publication or
dedication to the public. In passing, it may be well to note
that where a property right is negative and the damage is nil,
there is no common law right of protection.' 3
Statutory Copyright
Although, as has been seen, the common law copyright
owner was given many considerations, his rights ceased with
publication. Consequently, Congress, under the powers
granted by the constitution of the United States,'" enacted
a statutory copyright as early as 1790.5 From time to time,
since the passage of the first statutory copyright, there have
been changes and additions made, with the effect of gradu-
ally increasing the scope of protection given the author or
proprietor.
By 1909, there was a conglomeration of disjointed copy-
right statutes. This condition led to the passage of the pres-
ent Copyright Act of 1909. One court says,
"The great purpose in the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1909
was to bring together all of the statutes applicable to the subject of
copyright, and in many instances enlarge the protection secured by
copyright . . . 16
The effect of the statutory copyright protection in this coun-
try has been to secure for the author, or his successors in in-
terest, a monopoly, in the nature of a reward for his genius
13 International News Serv. v. Asso. Press, 248 U. S. 215, 63 L. ed. 211, 39
S. Ct. 68 (1918).
14 Art. 1, § 8, CI. 8.
15 C. 18, 1 Stat. 124 (1790).
16 M. Witmark & Sons v. Standard Music Roll Co., 221 F. 376 (1915).
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and industry, as well as for the encouragement of others.1
Consequently, as a result of the 1909 Copyright Act, Con-
gress increased the protection to the property interest of the
author's genius, 8 and created a simple and effective method
by which these rights could be insured, all of which served to
afford greater encouragement to production of literary works
of lasting benefits to the world. 9
After the creation of the statutory copyright, a question
arose as to whether or not one's common law protection exist-
ed even though the work was protected by the statutory
copyright. This problem was first presented in the English
case of Milla v. Taylor 20 where the plaintiff was an assignee
of a book entitled "The Seasons." The defendant had printed
the said book and sold it without consent of the plaintiff.
The plaintiff rested his case on his common law rights, as his
protection under the Statute of Anne had expired. The court
held that the plaintiff had a common law right of protection
as a property interest remained even though the statutory
protection had ceased. However, subsequently, in the case
of Donaldson v. Beckett 21 the court determined that where
one had been given statutory protection and this protection
had ceased, the author or proprietor was forever barred from
any further common law rights. The leading American case
on this point was Wheaton v. Peters 22 which followed the
latter English case holding that one's common law rights are
superseded by statute. Later American cases have reiterated
this view, that common law and statutory copyright may not
exist concurrently, but statutory copyright divests the owner
of his common law rights.2"
17 Washingtonian Pub. Co. v. Pearson, 305 U. S. 583, 83 L. ed. 365, 59 S.
Ct. 85 (1939).
18 Norm Co. v. John A. Brown and Co., 26 F. Supp. 707 (1939).
19 Buck v. Swanson, 33 F. Supp. 377 (1939); Marsh v. Buck, 313 U. S. 406,
61 S. Ct. 969 (1941).
20 4 Burr. 2303, 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (1769).
21 4 Burr. 2408, 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (1774).
22 33 U. S. 591, 8 L. ed. 1055 (1834).
23 Loew's Inc. v. Sup. Ct. of Los Angeles County, 115 P. 2d 983 (1941);
Stuff v. LaBudde Feed and Grain Co., 42 F. Supp. 493 (1942).
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When one acquires a statutory copyright, his rights are
based solely upon a construction of the Copyright Act. In a
leading case the court, speaking of the statute, says,
"The copyright statute ought to be reasonably construed, with a
view to effecting the purposes intended by Congress. They ought not to
be unduly extended by judicial construction to include privileges not
intended to be conferred, not so narrowly construed as to deprive those
entitled to their benefit of the rights Congress intended to grant." 24
However, another court 25 says that the act may be con-
strued so as to include situations not anticipated by Con-
gress, so long as there is a fair construction. Recent decisions
reiterate that there should be a liberal construction to the
Copyright Act as a means of carrying out the Congressional
intent to foster the copyright owner's protection and con-
sequently to encourage literary genius.26
Of course, another question which immediately comes to
mind is, who may acquire a statutory copyright? The ex-
tent of this problem warrants some special consideration.
The Acquisition of a Statutory Copyright
The Copyright Act provides for the persons who may be
entitled to a statutory copyright.27 And, every person aspir-
ing to gain the protection afforded by the Act must prescribe
to the provisions of the statute in order to reap the fruits of
his labor.2 The Act specifically provides that authors and
proprietors may obtain a statutory copyright,
"The author or proprietor of any work made the subject of copy-
right by this title, or his executors,- administrators, or assigns, shall
have copyright for such work under the conditions and for the terms
specified in this title." 29
An author has been defined as one who by his own intellect-
ual talents and labors produces a thing which is new in it-
24 Bobbs-MerriU Co. v. Strauss, 210 U. S. 339, 52 L. ed. 1086, 28 S. Ct. 722
(1908).
25 Remick v. Am. Auto Accessories Co., 5 F. 2d 411, 40 A. L. R. 1511 (1925).
26 Buck v. Gibbs, 34 F. Supp. 510 (1940); So. Music Pub. Co. v. Bibo Long
Inc., 10 F. Supp. 972 (1935); Westway Theatre v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film
Corp., 113 F. 2d 932 (1940).
27 17 U. S. C. A., § 8.
28 Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591, 8 L. ed. 1055 (1834).
29 17 U. S. C. A., § 8.
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self." However, if a person produces a thing which is similar
to the work of another, the former is not precluded from the
status of author if it can be shown that the work contains in-
dividuality which shows that the product was not copied or
aided by another's work."
However, the author must be careful to take advantage
of the rights afforded him by Congress. Thus, where an au-
thor allows a publisher to take out a copyright in the pub-
lisher's name, the author is subsequently estopped from as-
serting a right to the copyright.2 Of course, it is a question
of fact as to whether or not the author has relinquished his
rights to another, 3  and in certain instances equity may im-
press a trust, thus protecting the true owner. 4 These prob-
lems concerning equitable ownership will be discussed more
fully in subsequent pages.
It should be noted, however, that the rights of authors
once established, cannot be subsequently transgressed by
others. This is in accord with the spirit of the Act, to grant
protection and inspiration to the intellectual genius of man-
kind. Pursuant to this principle the court held that where
an author agreed to write a book to be copyrighted either by
the author or the stockholder of a corporation both parties
were proprietors and a subsequent copyright by a publishing
company of installments of the book published in the com-
pany's paper were void.35 Nevertheless, the author should be
careful to secure all of his due rights. Thus, it was held that
the author was not allowed to be protected by a publishing
company's copyright of the author's work when the author
had neglected to transfer his rights to the publishing com-
pany.
3 6
30 Atwell v. Ferrett, Fed. Cas. No. 3851 (1855).
31 Blume v. Spear, 30 F. 629 (1887).
32 Mifflin v. Ditton, 112 F. 1006, 61 L. R. A. 134 (1902).
33 Cohan v. Richmond, 19 F. Supp. 771 (1937).
34 Quinn-Brown Pub. Corp. v. Chilton Co., 15 F. Supp. 213 (1936).
35 Public Ledger Co. v. Post Pub. Co., 294 F. 430 (1923).
36 Kaplan v. Fox Film Corp., 19 F. Supp. 780 (1937).
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By and large, a proprietor obtains the same rights and pro-
tection, as the author, of the copyrighted product. 7 The
word "proprietor" has been construed to be equivalent to
"assign" which indicates that the proprietor receives the title
and interest to the work which is possessed by the author."
A proprietor or assignee is to be distinguished from a
licensee. An interesting case points out that where an author
retains a part of his rights prescribed by the statutory divi-
sion of rights the transferee from the author is a mere licensee
and as such does not enjoy the rights of proprietorship.3 ' It
has been held that a partnership '0 or a corporation "1 may be
a copyright owner. The copyright protection was primarily
intended to benefit the citizens of the United States and con-
sequently there are only certain limited circumstances when
aliens may avail themselves of the stututory protection.42
Employer-Employee Relations
Many disputes have arisen in cases where an employee was
the author of some particular work or art and the employer
claims proprietorship of the product. An interesting case held
that where an employee was paid by the employer to pro-
duce artistic works, the employer was entitled to copyright
the produce as his own.43 Likewise, where a song arranger
was paid a weekly salary to furnish music compositions, the
product of such labor is the property of the employer.44 But,
the courts have also said that an employee is not barred from
obtaining a copyright simply because he produced the work
as an employee.45 However, in another case where an em-
ployee prepared a treatise as a part of his work and obtained
a copyright on said treatise, it was held that the employee
37 Cohan v. Richmond, 19 F. Supp. 771 (1937).
88 Cohan v. Richmond, 19 F. Supp. 771 (1937).
39 Pub. Ledger Co. v. N. Y. Times, 275 F. 562 (1921).
40 Scribner v. Henry G. Allen Co., 49 F. 854 (1892).
41 Mutual Advertising Co. v. Refo, 76 F. 961 (1896).
42 17 U. S. C. A., § 8.
43 Nat. Cloak Co. v. United Correspondence School Co., 94 F. 152 (1899).
44 Tobani v. Carl Fisher Inc., 98 F. 2d 57 (1938).
45 No-Leak Piston Co. v. Norris, 277 F. 951 (1921).
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held the copyright in trust for his employer.46 But, where an
employer does possess a right and he assigns his. rights to a
third person, the latter may enforce a suit on infringement
against the employee author. 7
The question as to whether the employee or the employer
has the right to the products of the creative genius of the
former would seem to rest ultimately upon the employee-
employer contract of employment. The courts will determine
by a construction of the employment contract the intent of
the parties in regard to the proprietorship of the efforts of
the employee.
Equitable Ownership
It is possible under the Copyright Act to have the legal
title to a copyright in one person and the beneficial title in
another person."8 In this situation one court found that
where one possessed an equitable title to a photograph the
equitable owner was not justified in having another repro-
duce the photograph for the beneficiary without the consent
of the legal title holder.49 In a recent case, a city contracted
for the construction of a high school. There was a provision
in the contract that two murals were to be painted in the
school building, the city was to pay for them and also select
the artist to perform the work. There was no special agree-
ment that the artist should have a right to copyright the
murals; nevertheless the artist did have the murals copy-
righted and the court found that the artist held the copy-
right in trust for the city. 0 Where one obtains a copyright
by fraud the courts of equity will impress a constructive
trust requiring the fraudulent copyright holder to hold the
copyright in trust for the true owner.5' Although equity is
quick to aid those who -have rightful claims, yet equity re-
46 U. S. Ozone Co. v. U. S. Ozone Co. of America, 62 F. 2d 881 (1932).
47 Shapiro, Bernstein and Company v. Byran, 27 F. Supp. 11 (1939).
48 Hanson v. Joccard Jewelry Co., 32 F. 202 (1887).
49 Press Pub. Co. v. Folk, 59 F. 324 (1894).
50 Yardley v. Houghton Miffin Co., 108 F. 2d 28 (1939).
51 Press Pub. Co. v. Folk, 59 F. 324 (1894).
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quires those who seek equity to come into equity with "clean
hands." Pursuant to this maxim, a recent case says,
"Where the patent is used as a means of restraining competition...,
the successful prosecution of an infringement suit even against one who
is not a competitor in such a sale is a powerful aid to the maintenance
of the attempted monopoly. . . . Equity may rightly withhold its
assistance . . . by declining to entertain a suit for infringement, and
should do so .... ", 52
Joint Ownership
Not only may one acquire a copyright as an individual,
but it is also possible to hold a copyright jointly with one or
more other persons." The interest which a joint author en-
joys may be assigned, and his interest cannot be jeopardized
by the other joint holders. Thus, where two joint-authors of
a comic opera had it published and copyrighted, even though
the third author did not consent to the publication, and even
though the absence of her consent avoided the publication,
the third joint owner might accept the wrongful publication
and demand her proprietory rights. In such a case, the other
joint owners are constructive trustees for the third joint
owner.
54
In a recent case " the principles of joint ownership are ex-
tensively discussed. Speaking of joint ownership the court
says,
"Where the author of lyrics sends them to a composer, either directly
or through the medium of a producer or publisher, to have the com-
poser write the music for the lyrics so that the two are thus united into
one composition, the author of the lyrics and the composer of the music
are co-authors and the statutory copyright of the musical composition
is owned jointly by them. The same would be true if the composer of the
music with a similar purpose, submitted his composition to a writer of
lyrics in order that the lyrics and music should be published as a com-
posite whole. If one co-author, copyrights the musical composition in his
own name he becomes a constructive trustee for the other co-author."
52 Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 62 S. Ct. 402 (1942); B. B. Chem-
ical Co. v. Ellis, 62 S. Ct. 406 (1942).
53 Maurel v. Smith, 220 F. 195 (1915).
54 Maurel v. Smith, 220 F. 195 (1915).
55 Stuff v. La Budde Feed and Grain Co., 42 F. Supp. 493 (1942).
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The court continues, and speaking of renewals says,
"... the renewal copyright obtained by a co-author of a joint work em-
braces the whole work, that his interest in the renewal copyright is that
of an owner in common, that the renewal copyright enures to the benefit
of his co-author or of those entitled to a renewal under the provisions
of the Copyright Act, if that co-author be dead."
However, where parties wish to create a joint ownership
in a copyright, this intent should be specifically stated for
as a recent case points out,
"Joint estates, with their attendant incident of survivorship, are no
longer favored by the law, and will not be found unless the parties, by
specific language evidencing that intent, indicate the desire to create
such an estate." 56
Also, the joint owners may join in a suit for infringement.
Even where one person has a community of interests in two
or more separate copyrights and there has been an infringe-
ment of these separate copyrights there may be a separate
suit joining both separate causes of action.57 However, there
must be a community of interest to maintain such a joinder,
otherwise, separate and distinct causes of action exist which
may not be joined.5" An interesting case involving these
points was Buck v. Elm Lodge,59 in which ASCAP was the
licensee of certain songs of two separate music publishing
houses with a right of performance for profit. The defendant
infringed the copyrights of both of the separate songs, and
the plaintiff brought one suit joining the two publishing
houses as party plaintiffs. The court held this to be a proper
joinder saying that even though the plaintiff, as a mere
licensee could not maintain a suit alone, yet the plaintiff was
the real party in interest and the two other plaintiffs held
their rights in trust for ASCAP. The court stressed the ele-
ment of convenience and the community of interest of the
parties as a justification for their ruling.
56 Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 42 F. Supp. 859
(1942).
57 Buck v. Virgo, 22 F. Supp. 157.(1938).
58 Desylva, Brown, and Henderson, Inc. v. Weyman, 7 F. Supp. 725 (1934);
De Croisset v. Vitograph Co., 262 F. 100 (1919).
59 83 F. 2d 201 (1936).
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Thus far, chief concern has been placed on those who may
obtain a copyright, but once one obtains the copyright his
interest diverts to the extent of control which he obtains
over this property. In this respect assignments and licenses
serve to afford the copyright owner a possibility for further
enjoyment of the property he has acquired.
ASSIGNMENTS AND LICENSES
In General
The Copyright Act specifically provides for an assignment
of a copyright. " Generally, it is conceded that an assignment
should be in writing and recorded. 1 However, before pub-
lication, one may make an oral assignment. In this respect,
one court points out,
"One may become the owner, by a parol transfer, of whatever right
the author, prior to taking the copyright, had to convey." 62
Thus, even though the statute requires assignments of copy-
rights to be in writing, one may make, by parol, an assign-
ment of all of the common law rights which the assignor had
to convey. Although the statute requires a copyright to be
recorded, " the cases construe this section to be for the bene-
fit and protection of subsequent purchasers or mortgagees
for value, and an assignee would have a cause of action
against an infringer irrespective of the recording provision
of the act. 4 Accordingly, however, where there was an as-
signment of moving picture rights in a copyrighted novel, not
recorded pursuant to the statute, the assignment was held
60 17 U. S. C. A., § 42, "Assignments and bequests. Copyright secured under
this title or previous copyright laws of the United States may be assigned, granted,
or mortgaged by an instrument in writing signed by the proprietor of the copy-
right or may be bequeathed by will."
61 Pub. Ledger Co. v. Post Printing and Pub. Co., 294 F. 435 (1923).
62 Scribner v. Alien, 42 F. 618 (1890); Witmark and Sons v. Calloway, 22
F. 2d 412 (1927); Callahan v. Meyers, 128 U. S. 617, 32 L. ed. 547, 9 S. Ct. 177
(1888).
63 17 U. S. C. A., § 44.
64 New Fiction Pub. Co. v. Star Co., 220 F. 994 (1915).
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void as to subsequent assignees without notice whose as-
signment was recorded. 5
Where one has a number of rights under one copyright,
it is possible to assign certain of these rights to one and re-
tain or assign other rights under the same copyright to an-
other. Thus, it was held that one could assign the stage rights
to a play to one person and also assign the movie rights to
another." Likewise when the owner of a copyrighted story
having assigned the right of performance to a particular
copyrighted drama to one person, the owner could subse-
quently assign the right to performance of a different dram-
atization of the same story to another.67 Thus, the copy-
right and the subject of the copyright may be separately as-
signed."
The word "assign" has been held to be equivalent to the
word "proprietor." Thus, an assignee will obtain the rights
of an author or proprietor. 9 In attempting to construe an
assignment of a copyright, the courts employ the general
rules of contracts to ascertain the intent of the parties.7" Of
course, the extent of the rights which the assignee may ac-
quire are the rights which the assignor had to give.71 The
courts will look to the substance rather than the form to
ascertain whether an assignment has been made. To have
an assignment, title and interest to the subject of the assign-
ment is transferred to the assignee. Any agreement which
transfers a lesser interest is not technically an assignment,
though it may be called an assignment.7" Consequently, in
the case of Manners v. Morosco the court said,
05 Macloon v. Vitagraph, 30 F. 2d 634 (1929).
86 Macloon v. Vitagraph,-30 F. 2d 634 (1929).
67 Harper Bros. v. Kalem Co., 169 F. 61 (1909).
68 Werckmeister v. Am. Lit. Co., 134 F. 321, 69 C. C. A. 553, 68 L. R. A.
591 (1904).
69 Pub. Leg. Co. v. Post Printing and Pub. Co., 294 F. 435 (1923).
70 Holt v. Selver, 69 Mass. 438, 48 N. E. 837 (1897).
71 West Pub. Co. v. Edward Thompson Co., 169 F. 833 (1909).
72 Goldwyn Picture Corp. v. Howell Sales Co., 282 F. 9 (1922).
385
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"An agreement for production rights binding the parties, heirs, exec-
utors and assignees, administrators, and successors is an assignment
and not a mere license."1
73
Thus, to determine whether or not an assignment has been af-
fected, the court will look to the contract of the parties in or-
der to ascertain the intent, but a liberal construction will be
given in favor of the assignor. 74 Also, it has been held that
where a right is given and no time is set for the right to end,
it is presumed the right is perpetual, which would amount to
an assignment rather than a license. 75 Another interesting
case points out that where an absolute assignment has been
affected, it is the property of the assignee and passes to the
assignee's trustee in bankruptcy. 6 Also, in the case of Meyer
v. Washington Times Company 77 it was held that where
a newspaper was licensed to use certain comic strips by a
newspaper syndicate, this contract was assignable to a
trustee in bankruptcy even though the contract created a
mere license and not an assignment. The court said that this
was not a personal contract, but rather an ordinary contract
which might be assigned.
Rights Acquired by an Assignment and a License
By an assignment the copyright owner divorces himself
from the particular title and interest which he has assigned.
On the contrary, the rights of a licensee will rest solely upon
the contract between the licensor and licensee rather than
upon the rights given the proprietor under the Copyright
Act.
Consequently, while a proprietor may maintain a suit for
infringement, 8 a mere licensee is not granted this privilege.79
73 258 F. 557 (1919); To same effect see: Photo Drama Motion Picture Co.
v. U-Film Corp., 213 F. 374 (1914).
74 Pierpont v. Fowle, 19 F. Cas. No. 111 (1846).
75 W. U. Tel. Co. v. Penn. Co., 729 F. 849, 64 C. C. A. 285, 68 L. R. A. 968
(1904).
76 In re Hawlay-Dresser and Co., 132 F. 1002 (1904).
77 76 F. 2d 988 (1935).
78 17 U. S. C. A., § 25.
79 Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U. S. 252, 34 L. ed. 929, 11 S. Ct. 334 (1890);
Goldwyn Picture Corp. v. Howell Sales Co., 282 F. 9 (1922).
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The assignee of an author's work has the right to have the
work copyrighted, but naturally, this right does not carry
over to a mere licensee."0 Likewise, a licensee of the right
to use a play cannot confer upon a printer and publisher of
the play the power to have the play copyrighted."'
It should be remembered by the copyright owner that by
an assignment, he parts with his title and interest to the
thing assigned.82 As a result, the rights of the assignee can-
not be subsequently affected by any actions of the assignor,
whereas, if a mere license existed, the copyright owner might
affect the rights of licensee.88 The recent case of K7iger v.
MacFadden Publications 84 serves to illustrate these points.
In the latter case, the plaintiff wrote a song and assigned it
to the Famous Music Corporation with an agreement that
if the latter did not publish it in a salable form within one
ypar, the property would revert to the assignor. The Famous
Music Corporation took the song and had it copyrighted, and
while this corporation held the copyright, the defendant in-
fringed the copyright. Subsequent to this infringement the
plaintiff, assignor, asked for and received a reassignment of
the copyrighted song. Then, the plaintiff brought suit against
the defendant for infringement. The court held the plaintiff
had no cause of action against the defendants as the latter's
infringement was against the Famous Music Corporation
and the subsequent quitclaim made by the Famous Music
Corporation to the plaintiff did not entitle the plaintiff to
the rights which the former corporation had enjoyed.
Assignment and Licenses Distinguished
Whether or not one has created a license or an assignment
will depend upon the contract of the parties.8 5 The problem
80 Public Ledger Co. v. New York Times, 275 F. 562 (1921).
81 Kappel v. Downing, 11 App. D. C. 93 (1897).
82 Ford v. Blaney Ames Co., 148 F. 642 (1906).
83 Kortlander v. Bradford, 190 N. Y. S. 311 (1921).
84 43 F. Supp. 170 (1942).
85 Anderson and Company v. Baldwin Law Pub. Co., 27 F. 2d 82 (1928).
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is elementary when the author or proprietor is careful to
point out the specific rights which are to be given. Thus,
where an author makes an outright assignment of all title
and interest, the result is conclusively an assignment, and
conversely where an authorization to perform certain re-
stricted acts is given a license is presumably created.
The difficulty in ascertaining whether an assignment or
a license is created occurs in the cases where some partial
right is transferred. An author may allow another person
the exclusive right to the copyright for a particular time,
in a particular territory, or for a particular use. As to whether
or not these partial assignments of specific rights will con-
stitute a license or a valid assignment will essentially de-
pend upon the contract of the parties.
Where one gives to another the exclusive right to a
copyright for a certain period of time, it would seem un-
objectionable to allow the assignee the rights of a pro-
prietor. The rights in the copyright would revest in the
author or proprietor at the end of the time set by the con-
tract, and prior to this time, the assignee could protect his
rights to much better advantage than in the case where a
mere license exists. Certain difficulties might exist where the
assignee of a common law copyright while holding the copy-
right for a certain period of time published the work thus
destroying the rights of the assignor. However, in the main,
it would seem that the expediency and benefits of allowing
a partial assignment for a certain period of time to be con-
strued as a valid assignment of the copyright for the time
stated would override the possible injustices of such a con-
struction. A recent case sanctions this view when the court
held that a grant of a song to a music company with all rights
and interests for a period of one year was a valid assignment
and the music company was the proprietor of the song for
the period specified. 80 However, in an earlier case where
86 Kriger v. MacFadden Publications, 43 F. Supp. 170 (1942).
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ASCAP had the exclusive license of the right of non-dramatic
performance for profit for a given time, the court construed
this to be a mere license."7 Again, the determining factor as
to the legal status of the parties will depend upon the in-
tent expressed in their contract.
Where a partial assignment was attempted as to a cer-
tain territory, the court held a mere license was created, and
not an assignment."8 But, where there was an assignment of
a common law copyright to be used in certain nations only,
the court held that an assignment was created and the as-
signee was a proprietor of the copyright, not merely a
licensee; 9 Consequently, where there is an assignment of a
partial interest as to the area in which the assignee may use
the copyright, this operates as a mere license under the
statute, but as a valid assignment under the common law
copyright.
The most complicated and unsettled problem as to partial
assignments has arisen where one attempted to assign only
a part of his rights. Thus, where the exclusive use to certain
advance sheets was given, the court held that such a contract
created a mere license and not an assignment.90 Likewise,
where a copyright owner transferred the "serial rights,"
which comprehended all publishing rights, to a publishing
company, which company published the material and had it
copyrighted, the court found that the publishing company
had no right ,to this copyright as the publishing company
was a mere licensee.91
The greatest difficulties in regard to the partial assign-
ments of a certain kind of rights or class of rights has arisen
in the so-called "movie cases." Here, the copyright owner
87 M. Witmark and Sons v. Pastime Amusement Co., 298 F. 470 (1924).
88 Davis v. Vories, 141 Mo. 234, 42 -S. W. 707 (1897).
89 Harper and Bros. v. M. A. Donahue and Co., 144 F. 191 (1905).
90 Fraser v. Yock, 116 F. 285 (1902).
91 New Fiction Pub. Co. v. Star Co., 220 F. 994 (1915).
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has attempted to transfer part of his rights to one person
with the remaining rights in the grantor. Thus, where one
was given the exclusive right to "produce, perform and rep-
resent" a play "on the stage" the court found that there was
a license to produce the play on the stage and the movie
rights remained in the licensor. 2 But, the exclusive right to
"produce" a play was construed to be a grant of movie
rights.9" Likewise, where one had the exclusive right to per-
form a play in dialogue, the court reasoned that this carried
with it an implied sanction to produce the play on the
screen.94 In Harper Brothers v. Kaw 9 the court held that
where a license was granted to produce a play, a negative
covenant carried with this license not to give the movie rights
to another while the license was in force. The court reasoned
that if one gives one right to one person, it is implied that
this right will not be destroyed by a subsequent grant. This
view is reiterated in the case of Underhill v. Schenck.98
However, in the case of Macloon v. Vitagraph,97 the ex-
clusive play right was sold to one person and the movie right
was reserved to the copyright owner. Subsequently, the
copyright owner sold the movie right to Warner Brothers,
and the grantee of the play right objected on the ground
that there is an implied negative covenant that the rights
so given will not be subsequently infringed by another as-
signment. However, the court held that no such negative
covenant existed and Warner Brothers have the movie
rights. The court pointed out that in this case the movie
rights had been specifically retained by the grantor; and
also another reason for this decision was,
"The law always favors the free and unrestricted use of property,
and doubts and ambiguities should be resolved in favor of the natural
right to such free use and enjoyment, and against restrictions thereof."
92 Klein v. Beach, 239 F. 108 (1917).
93 Frohman v. Fitch, 149 N. Y. S. 633 (1914); Lipzin v. Gardin, 166 N. Y. S.
792 (1915).
94 Hart v. Fox, 166 N. Y. S. 793 (1917).
95 232 F. 609 (1916).
96 193 N. Y. S. 745 (1922), modified 238 N. Y. 7, 143 N. E. 773 (1924).
97 30 F. 2d 634 (1929).
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In another case, the court found that where one is given the
right to make movies, there is an implied right to make talk-
ing pictures.98
Thus, the problem as to what has been created, a license
or an assignment, will revolve around the provisions of the
Copyright Act and the contract of the parties. If a right does
not have a statutory division of its own; a transfer of that
right to another will be a license and not an assignment.99
Also, it is highly important to clearly set forth in the con-
tract the rights and limitations which one seeks to create.1"'
For, where there are ambiguities and uncertainties, the de-
termination of the intent of the parties is left to the courts,
and often a poorly written contract may serve to frustrate
the intent of the parties.
Enforcement of Right
Although it is important for one to appreciate whether
or not a license or an assignment is being created, it is even
more necessary for one to understand the exact nature of his
rights and the enforcibility of these rights. In order that
one may sue, some right which he has must have been trans-
gressed. Thus, for a right of action, it is necessary to know
what amount of damages is necessary to create a cause of
action. Where there is a suit for infringement, it is not nec-
essary that a whole or even a substantial part of your work
be copied. But, enough damage must have resulted to take
the case out of the doctrine of de minmus non curat lex.
Generally, it may be said that a substantial or material dam-
age must result from such infringement. To ascertain what
constitutes substantial or material damage, one must con-
98 Murphy v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 112 F. 2d 746 (1940).
99 17 U. S. C. A., § 1; Photo-Drama Motion Picture Co. v. Social Uplift Film
Corp., 220 F. 448 (1915) construes 17 U. S. C. A., § 5 grants the assignee of movie
rights the status of proprietor; also compare Goldwyn Picture Corp. v. Howells,
282 F. 9 (1922), which denies the assignee of motion picture rights the right to
sue for infringement, and M. Witmark and Sons v. Pastime Amusement Co., 298
F. 470 (1924).
100 Macdoon v. Vitagraph, 30 F. 2d 634 (1929).
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suit etch set of facts separately, but the courts are generally
rather liberal in this construction.10' An interesting case
along this line points out that where the defendant charged
for the entertainment and the chorus of a copyrighted song
is played as a part of the general entertainment, this
amounts to a playing for profit and thus is an infringement
of the copyright.0 2
If one is a mere licensee, he does not have the right to sue
for an infringement. So, where the plaintiff, the proprietor
of a musical composition entitled "Kiss Me Again" executed
to ASCAP what is termed an assignment of performing
rights, that is, the exclusive right to public performance for
profit of the musical composition above mentioned, and the
defendant infringed this copyright by playing the chorus
of the song in his theatre, the court held the plaintiff could
sue for infringement as he was a copyright proprietor and
his agreement with ASCAP was a mere license not an as-
signment,
"In relation to the right to sue for an infringement, a copyright is an
indivisible thing, and cannot be split up and partially assigned either
as to time, place or particular rights or privileges, less than the sum of
all the rights comprehended in the copyright . . . of course, such ex-
clusive rights may be granted, limited as to time, place or extent of
privileges which the grantee may enjoy; but the better view is that
such limited grants operate merely as licenses, and not technical as-
signments, although often spoken of as assignments." 103
In the case of Buck v. Virgo,10 ASCAP was a licensee of
songs of certain publishers. These publishers assigned to
ASCAP the exclusive non-dramatic public performance
rights to all music owned or subsequently produced to Jan-
uary 1, 1941. ASCAP joined the proprietors and brought
101 Bloom v. Nixon, 125 F. 977 (1903); Green v. Luby, 177 F. 287 (1909);
Witmark and Sons v. Pastime Amusement Co., 298 F. 470 (1922).
102 John Church Co. v. Hillard Hotel, 242 U. S. 591, 61 L. ed. 511 (1916).
103 Witmark and Sons v. Pastime Amusement Co., 298 F. 470 (1924).
104 22 F. Supp. 156 (1938).
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suit for infringement. The court held that a licensee could
sue where he joined the legal title-holder.
Another problem closely allied to an infringement suit
is the right of the copyright owner to royalties. If a copy-
right owner agrees to certain royalties, he is entitled to re-
cover those royalties even though no performance for profit
has been given.' 05 Also, if a license is given to one to show
films for eight years with a provision for periodic payments
of royalties and no royalties are paid for the first six months,
this amounts to a material breach of the contract and the
licensor may terminate the contract.0 6 However, in the case
where one wrote a vaudeville sketch with royalties to be
paid over a seventy-week period, it was held no royalties,
should be paid unless the sketch was produced. 107 Another
point for the proprietor to keep in mind is that where there
is an action for royalties equity will not take jurisdiction if
there is an adequate remedy at law. Also, where there is a
debtor-creditor relationship there is no equitable remedy
for an accounting as an adequate remedy at law is avail-
able.108 Copyright owners may pool their interests in view
of one royalty so long as their agreement does not constitute
a combination in restraint of trade.'
Thus, if one is an assignee, it is possible for him to pro-
tect the rights given to him by a suit against an infringer in
his own name, but if the transferee of a right is a mere
licensee, the rights which he enjoys must be protected by the
licensor for the licensee is barred from suing in his own name
without joining the licensor. Also, it must be remembered
that in order to maintain any suit, it must be alleged and
proven that damage has resulted."'
105 Maxwell v. Foust and Co., 154,N. Y. S. 224 (1915).
106 De Mille Co. v. Casey, 201 N. Y. S. 20 (1923).
107 Kennedy v. Rolfe, 160 N. Y. S. 93 (1916).
108 Ehrlich v. Jack Mills, 213 N. Y. S. 395 (1926).
109 Buck v. Gibbs, 61 S. Ct. 962 (1941).





Since the rights of the copyright owner are generally en-
forced to the fullest extent by means of contractual obliga-
tions, it is very necessary that the proprietor of a copyright
understand the extent to which his rights will be enforced by
his contracts, and the limitations of his rights by failure to
employ the proper procedure. This latter point is illustrated
in the famous Bobbs-Merrill Case."' The appellant brought
suit against the respondent appellees to restrain the sale of
a copyrighted novel, "The Castaway," at a retail price of
less than one dollar per copy. Printed below the copyright
notice, on the page in the book following the title page, was
inserted the following notice: "The price of this book is one
dollar net. No dealer is licensed to sell it at a less price, and
a sale at a less price will be treated as an infringement of the
copyright." These books were sold to wholesalers and sub-
sequently they were resold to retailers. Some of these re-
tailers sold "The Castaway" for eighty-nine cents, and it was
alleged that this amounted to an infringement of the copy-
right. There is no question of notice as all parties had notice
not to sell the book for less than one dollar. The question pre-
sented to the court was: Does the sole right of the copyright
owner to vend, secure to the copyright this right, after one
sale of the book has been made? In this case, the sole right of
the copyright owner was based upon the Copyright Act as
there was no other contractual obligation except the mere no-
tice in the book. The court held this notice was not sufficient
to protect the copyright owner from infringement beyond the
first purchaser, the court saying:
"To add to the right of exclusive sale the authority to control all
future retail sales, by a notice that such sales must be made at a fixed
sum, would give a right not included in the terms of the statute, and,
111 Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U. S. 339, 52 L. ed. 1086, 28 S. Ct. 722
(1908).
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in our view, extend its operation by construction, beyond its meaning,
when interpreted with a view to ascertaining the legislative intent in its
enactment."
Likewise, where there was a mere giving to a musician of
professional copies of music, a license to publicly perform
was not affected."' It is evident that there must be some-
thing more than a mere notice or giving to create an enforce-
able license. If there is a restrictive contract between the
vendor and vendee these restrictions may carry to third per-
sons, as one court points out,
"If a person purchases from another a printing press, having knowl-
edge of the existence of a contract between the vendor and third per-
sons, whereby the vendor has agreed not to sell such presses except
under certain restrictions, such third person is entitled to enforce his
contract as against the vendee. . . . Contracts prohibiting the use of
personal property in a particular way are valid." 113
Likewise, where a copyrighted book was sold with a provi-
sion in the contract that it should not be resold, offered or
advertised for sale prior to August 1, 1907, this was held to
be a valid restriction, binding on third persons who took
with notice." 4 It is evident that by a contractual arrange-
ment, the author or proprietor can create the greatest con-
trol over his product. Of course, even by contract there are
certain restrictions which have been placed upon the author
and proprietor, and it now seems pertinent to illustrate some
of the more important situations where the copyright owner
exceeded the powers granted by the Copyright Act.
Contracts in Restraint of Trade
With the rapid growth of "big business" fostered by su-
perior communication and transportation facilities in the
latter half of the nineteenth century, there came an increas-
ing demand from the general public for a curbing of monop-
olies. The result was the passage by Congress of 'the Sher-
112 Harms v. Cohen, 279 F. 276 (1922).
113 Murphy v. Christian Press Association Pub. Co., 38 App. Div. 42, 56
N. Y. S. 597 (1899).
114 Authors & Newspapers Assn. v. O'Gormon, 147 F. 616 (1906).
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man Anti-Trust Act in 1890, followed by the Clayton Anti-
Trust Act in 1914 and subsequent other anti-monopoly legis-
lation. Many states, also, joined the crusade by passing local
anti-monopoly legislation. The effect of this legislation has
naturally reflected on the copyright owner for a copyright
is in itself a monopoly.
One of the first problems with which the copyright owner
is confronted is the right to maintain resale prices."' In
Straus v. American Publishing Company,"6 the defendant
company had contracts with its vendees prohibiting the
vendees from selling their wares except at a set price, and
the defendant refused to sell to companies who would not
conform to this agreement. The question presented was
whether this price maintenance violated the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act. The court answered in the affirmative, holding
this agreement restrained trade under the meaning of the
Sherman Act, the court saying,
"No more than the patent statute was the copyright act intended to
authorize agreements in unlawful restraint of trade and tending to
monopoly, in violation of the specific terms of the Sherman law ... ." 117
However, neither the Bobbs-Merrill Case "I or the case of
Straus v. American Publishing Company 9 completely neg-
ative the right of the copyright holder to control retail prices.
Although, under these cases, he cannot base a charge of con-
tributory infringement upon a sale of copies at less than the
price fixed by him, and although he may not combine with
other proprietors of copyrights for the purpose of coercing
dealers to maintain a fixed retail price, he may, as an in-
cident of his statutory right exclusively to publish and vend
copies of the copyright production, contract with vendees as
115 "Price-fixing is distinguished from price maintenance in that in the former
the legislature regulates the charges for goods and services whereas in the latter
it is the manufacturer of the goods who dictates resale price." Dykstra, Textbook
on Government and Business, § 123, p. 244 (1938).
116 231 U. S. 222, 58 L. ed. 192, 34 S. Ct. 84, L. R. A. 1915 A. 1099 (1913).
117 For a case holding the patent statute under the Sherman Act see: Stand-
ard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. U. S., 226 U. S. 20, 57 L. ed. 107, 33 S. Ct. 9 (1912).
118 210 U. S. 339, 52 L. ed. 1086, 28 S. Ct. 722 (1908).
119 231 U. S. 222, 58 L. ed. 192, 34 S. Ct. 84, L. R. A. 1915 A. 1099 (1913).
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to the price of resale. Contracts of this sort are outside the
rule against restraint of trade, because they fall within the
exception existing in the case of ancillary stipulations rea-
sonably necessary to the protection of a party to a legitimate
business transaction. 120
Although it is unquestionably true that,
"The right of an author to a monopoly of his publication is meas-
ured and determined by the Copyright Act." 121
nevertheless, the Copyright Act must be read and construed
in the light of other laws. Consequently, the problem of re-
sale price maintenance must be viewed in the light of con-
tracts in restraint of trade and their interpretation under the
anti-monopoly legislation. The early cases favored liberality
for the copyright monopolists,
"The right of a patentee, owner of a copyright or owner of a secret
process is merely the right of exclusion or debarment. . . . He may
sell or not, as he chooses. He may sell at one price to one person, and
another to another person. He is not required to give reasons or deal
fairly with purchasers." 122
Likewise, another case allows resale price maintenance to
the patentee and copyright holder saying,
"Cries of restraint of trade and impairment of the freedom of sales
are unavailing because for the promotion of useful arts the constitution
and statutes authorize this very monopoly." 123
However, a later leading case definitely held that contracts
in interstate commerce between nanufacturers, wholesalers,
and retailers in which the latter agreed to maintain prices
dictated by the manufacturer were in violation of the Sher-
man Act and served to restrain trade.'24 This case carried a
strong dissent -by Justice Holmes on the theory that al-
though competition among retailers selling Dr. Miles prod-
120 For a digest of re-sale price control see: Ely Lilly Co. v. Saunders, 216
N. C. 163, 4 S. E. 2d, 12S A. I. R. 1308 (1939).
121 Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U. S. 82, 43 L. ed. 904, 19 S. Ct. 606 (1898).
122 Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Platt, 142 F. 606 (1906).
123 Victor Talking Machine Co. v. Fair, 123 F. 424 (1903).
124 Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Parks and Sons Co.; 220 U. S. 373,
55 L. ed. 502, 31 S. Ct. 376 (1911).
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ucts was stifled, yet there still remained competition between
Dr. Miles' products and other products of a similar nature,
and thus, the case should not be ruled by the Sherman Act.
Also, after this case became law, there was a demand for a
change in the Sherman Act to allow resale price control. The
result was the Miller-Tydings Act which provided for mini-
mum resale prices if the state law where the resale was made
allows the manufacturer to dictate minimum prices. How-
ever, if the state has no law, or if the state does not permit
resale price maintenance, then the Dr. Miles Case 125 applies.
Although the copyright owner is restricted in the extent
to which he may go to control resale prices, the author or
proprietor does have a right to vend his article at his own
price.126 This view is emphasized in the Coca-Cola Company
v. State 127 when the court says,
"The right of the owner of property to dispose of same upon such
terms as he may see proper is universal."
Also, although the courts have frowned upon a person's con-
trol over resale prices, yet, the Supreme Court of the United
States has sanctioned one's right to "suggest" resale prices. 2 '
There are certain other interesting restrictions placed up-
on the use of the copyright. First of these are pools. It is not
unlawful for one or more individuals to pool their interests
and recover one royalty on the pooled interests,'29 unless
such an arrangement serves to constitute a restraint of
125 Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Parks and Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373,
55 L. ed. 502, 31 S. Ct. 376 (1911); Another interesting case follows the Dr.
Miles case saying, "The owner of an article protected by a patent, copyright, or
trade mark, when he has manufactured and sold the same, cannot impose restric-
tions upon the vendee as to the future sales of the same. Having parted with his
ownership therein, it enters the channels of trade as an article of commerce, and
is thereafter, beyond his control." Coca-Cola v. State, 225 S. W. 791 (1920).
126 17 U. S. C. A., § 1.
127 225 S. W. 791 (1920).
128 U. S. v. Colgate and Co., 250 U. S. 300, 63 L. ed. 992, 39 S. Ct. 465
(1919); U. S. v. A. Schrader's Sons Inc., 252 U. S. 85, 64 L. ed. 471, 40 S. Ct.
251 (1920).
129 Standard Oil Co. v. U. S., 283 U. S. 163, 75 L. ed. 926, 51 S. Ct. 421
(1930).
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trade.' Another restriction on one's free use of his property
is the tying clause and the restrictive lease.
"Briefly, a 'tying' clause is an agreement where one or more differ-
ent articles are tied together for sale or lease and may include, and gen-
erally does, a provision, by implication or otherwise, not to use other
products of a competitor in combination with the goods which have
been sold or leased." 131
These clauses are bad under section three of the Clayton
Act but it is necessary to show that such a clause lessens
competition, and if this is not shown a prosecution will not
lie.3 2 As has been seen, one may make restrictive leases or
licenses, but even though one is protected by the Copyright
Act or the Patent Act one can not so restrict the use of the
goods as to constitute a "tying" contract which is illegal un-
der the anti-monopoly laws. 33
Exclusive agreements are also bad under section three of
the Clayton Act. Briefly, an. exclusive agreement is an ar-
rangement whereby goods are sold by vendor on condition
that a vendee will not deal in similar goods of vendor's com-
petitors.' In the case of Bement and Sons v. National Har-
row Company 35 it was held that an agreement by a licensor
of a patent with the licensee that the licensor would not
license any other person to produce a certain product which
the licensee was producing was valid and not in restraint of
trade under the Sherman Act. However, it is possible that
such an agreement might be struck down under section three
of the Clayton Act as the practice "may be to substantially
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly." 13
Other problems worthy of consideration in this regard are
"full line forcing" and "block booking." These are nothing
130 Watson v. Buck, 313 U. S. 378, 61 S. Ct. 962 (1941).
131 Dykstra, Textbook on Government and Business, § 202, p. 453 (1938).
132 Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 421, 64 L. ed. 993, 40 S.
Ct. 572 (1920).
133 United Shoe Machinery Co. v. U. S., 258 U. S. 451, 66 L. ed. 708, 42
S. Ct. 363 (1922).
134 Dykstra, Textbook on Government and Business, § 207, p. 460 (1938).
135 186 U. S. 70, 46 L. ed. 1058, 22 S. Ct. 747 (1902).
136 This case was decided before the Clayton Act was passed.
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more than particular tying clauses, the former in which a
company producing many products refuses to sell unless the
vendee is willing to accept the full line of the vendor's goods;
the latter is employed in the movie industry requiring the ex-
hibitor of films to accept a group of films irrespective of the
exhibitor's wishes. One case on "block booking" held that
this arrangement did not violate the federal acts as the movie
company did not control the market and the contract did
not lessen competition.181 Another interesting case which
involved a similar point was the case of Interstate Circuit v.
United States of America.13 In this case the Interstate Cir-
cuit and the Texas Consolidated Theaters were movie dis-
tributors and they warned the movie distributors that they
would refuse to buy "first run" pictures unless the distribu-
tors would agree not to allow "subsequent run" theaters to
show these first run pictures for less than twenty-five cents,
and never as a part of a double feature. Under this pressure,
Paramount, the copyright owner of certain first run pic-
tures, made an agreement with its licensee, the Consolidated
Theaters, to enforce these restrictions in certain districts
where no other restrictions were enforced. However, the
court decided this agreement restrained trade and was con-
sequently invalid. There was a vigorous dissent on the
ground that the copyright owner under the statutory monop-
oly was given the right to deal with his property as he saw
fit, and his action here was not arbitrary or unreasonable
and they would not restrain trade as the copyright owner
did not have a monopoly of the field.
Thus, although the Copyright Act affords the author or
proprietor a monopoly, as a method of protecting and en-
couraging individual genius, nevertheless, the copyright own-
er is not allowed to run rampant over the rights of others
protected by the federal anti-trust acts. It should be re-
membered by the copyright owner that in all of these prac-
137 Federal Trade Commission v. Paramount Famous-Lasky Corp., 57 F. 2d
152 (1932).
138 306 U. S. 2Q8, 83 L. ed. 610, 59 S. Ct. 467 (1938).
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tices which have been discussed - resale price maintenance,
tying contracts, exclusive agreements, and block booking
- the ultimate test as to whether or not section one of the
Sherman Act is violated will be, is this action "in restraint
of trade;" as to whether or not section three of the Clayton
Act is violated the test will be, is it possible that this action,
"may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create
a monopoly," and as to whether or not section five of the
Federal Trade Commission Act is violated, look to see wheth-
er there is a "tendency" to lessen competition.
Thus far, chief concern has been given to whether or not
the actions of the author or proprietor in dealing with his
copyright has violated any federal laws. Accordingly, it is
just as important to note the effect of a violation of a state
law. Of course, the federal law is the supreme law of the
land and no state law can supersede the federal enactments.
This is pointed out in the case of Coca-Cola v. State 139 when
the court says,
"Private monopolies are contrary to the genius of commercial peo-
ple, and contracts in restaint of trade are not looked upon with favor.
The Constitution of the United States, however, expressly provides for
the creation of monopolies in the matter of patent rights, trade marks
and copyrights .... Congress has legislated under this provision, and
no state can nullify its acts."
However, the Supreme Court of the United States has re-
cently held that a copyright owner may be subject to the
state anti-trust laws as well as the federal anti-trust laws. 40
In the case of Marsk v. Bick, the State of Florida had passed
an anti-trust act which was more far-reaching than the fed-
eral legislation and the American Society of Composers,
Authors and Publishers was being sued under the local state
act, and the defendants pleaded the fact that they were un-
der the Copyright Act and the state act should not be en-
forced. The court held, however, contracts are entirely sub-
ject to state laws if they are solely intra-state agreements and
139 225 S. W. 791 (1922).
140 Watson v. Ruck, 313 U. S. 378, 61 S. Ct. 962 (1941).
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the state laws will apply unless the state law violates some
federal law wherein the latter will supersede the state law.
14 1
Although the author or proprietor may have some of his
rights limited by a violation of the anti-trust laws, it may be
well to point out that this anti-monopoly legislation can not
be enforced by a collateral attack, rather there must be a
direct attack,142 unless a contract grows directly out of an
illegal agreement and there is no independent or collateral
agreement. 143 Consequently, in a suit by ASCAP for an in-
fringement where the defendant answered alleging that
ASCAP was a monopoly, controlling virtually all of the
"popular music" and isin restraint of trade
"by means of their monopoly . . . arbitrarily and capriciously give and
withhold the privilege of reproducing such music and arbitrarily fix the
charges for such privilege"
the court granted a motion to strike saying,
"It is clear that the rights under the copyright laws are exclusive.
To permit this paragraph in the respondent's answer to exercise its
force and effect is to destroy the exclusiveness given by the Constitu-
tion and the laws thereunder to the petitioners' copyright." 144
Attention has been devoted to the importance of contracts
to the copyright owner. By a poorly written or ambiguous
contract the author may lose his valuable rights; also, the
greedy copyright owner may dissipate his efforts by exe-
cuting an unenforceable or illegal contract. But, on the con-
trary, if the author or proprietor has availed himself of the
general laws pertaining to contracts and especially the rights
given to him by the Copyright Act it is possible for him to
reap the just fruits of his labor.
Closely allied to the law of copyright is the law pertaining
to patents and trade marks. Consequently, if an author or a
proprietor ever has the opportunity to select his protection
141 Marsh v. Buck, 313 U. S. 406, 61 S. Ct. 969 (1941); compare: Buck v.
Gibbs, 34 F. Supp. 510 (1940);. Buck v. Swanson, 33 F. Supp. 387 (1939).
142 Witmark and Sons v. Pastime Amusement Co., 298 F. 470 (1922).
143 Continental Paper Co. v. Voight, 212 U. S. 227, 53 L. ed. 486, 29 S. Ct.
280 (1908).
144 Buck v. Hillsgrove Country Club, 17 F. Supp. 643, (1937).
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from one or the other of these protective agencies it would be
well for him to comprehend the laws regarding each, that
he might afford himself the greatest protection. As a result,
let us examine briefly some of the distinctions among Pat-
ents, Copyrights and Trade Marks.
PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS AND TRADE MARKS
Patents, copyrights, and trade marks have many things
in common, but just as individuals, each has its own peculiar-
ities and distinctions which set it apart from the other. As
one court points out,
"A trade mark, patent, or copyright is property .... However valu-
able it may be to its owner, it is nothing more than a privilege, valuable
because of its exclusiveness .... A copyright, while possessing the same
attributes of monopoly as a patent or trade mark, differs from both of
them in that it applies exclusively to works of art or literature. In a
copyright as in a patent the owner loses control of the article when it
is sold." 145
The property right in a trade mark, if there be any, comes
from its association with a particular business or product.
Consequently, the owner of a trade mark cannot make a neg-
ative or prohibitive use of it as a monopoly such as can the
patent or copyright holder. 4 ' These points are forcefully
brought to mind in United States v. Steifins 147 where the
court says,
"At common law the exclusive right to it (the trade mark) grows
out of the use of it, and not its mere adoption. By the Act of Congress
this exclusive right attaches upon registration. But in neither case does
it depend upon novelty, upon invention, upon discovery, or upon any
work of the brain. It requires no fancy or imagination, no genius, no
laborious thought. It is simply founded on priority of appropriation."
Also, in regard to a trade mark the doctrine of unfair com-
petition is applied in recovery for infringement. This is neces-
sarily based on the damage which accrues to the owner. And
accordingly the damage will depend upon the use of the
145 Coca-Cola v. State, 225 S. W. 791 (1922).
146 United Drug Co. v. Rectanus Co., 248 U. S. 90, 63 L. ed. 141 (1918).
147 100 U. S. 82, 25 L. ed. 550 (1879).
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trade mark. However, in patents and copyrights a right of
action may accrue and damages be allowed pursuant to the
statutes even though no tangible damage has been effected.
There is another distinction among these rights in regard
to assignments and licenses. The patent and copyright stat-
utes give their owners certain rights such as making and
selling the articles, and any person acquiring by assignment
or license an interest in such invention or authorship takes
title subject to prior assignments or licenses of which the as-
signee must inform himself as best he can and at his own
risk, but the owner of a secret process has no such exclusive
right and a person acquiring an assignment or license is
bound to respect prior assignments only to the extent to
which he contracts with the licensor.'48 Thus, a trade mark
will protect the owner from use by another while the prop-
erty held has some economic value, but there need be no spe-
cial monetary or tangible value to enforce one's right in a
thing protected under a patent or copyright statute.'49
Although the patent and copyright statutes are very simi-
lar in their protection to the owners, it would seem that the
patent statute affords the owner somewhat greater protec-
tion than does the copyright monopoly. The patent grants
the owner the exclusive right to use, make and sell the prod-
uct. The copyright statute gives an author or proprietor the
exclusive right to vend and multiply copies. 5 ' The copy-
right owner does not have exclusive use granted as does the
patent holder, and the courts have not extended this right
to the extent that the courts dealing with patent have al-
lowed this right of use to be enforced. Thus, where a copy-
right holder placed a notice that the copyright article should
not be sold at less than a certain price, the court found that
mere notice by the author or proprietor was not sufficient to
impress a restrictive license or contractual arrangement, and
148 Am. Dirigold Corp. v. Dirigold Metals Corp., 125 F. 2d 446 (1942).
149 Am. Dirigold Corp. v. Dirigold Metals Corp., 125 F. 2d 446 (1942).
150 Park v. Hartman, 153 F. 24, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 135 (1907).
RIGHTS OF COPYRIGHT OWNER
in the absence of this, the Copyright Act did not supply any
relief. 5' But, in the case involving patents where the patent
holder had a patent on cotton ties, and stamped on each
cotton tie,
"Licensed to- use once -only"
and subsequently these belts were rebuilt and resold by a
third party, the court held the third party liable as an in-
fringer of the patent.'52 But, even though the patent act
confers the exclusive right to "use" his product, whereas the
copyright statute is silent on the use, by and large the pro-
tection granted to each is similar, and the vending in the
Copyright Act and exclusive right to sell in the patent act
has been judicially construed to grant the same protection
in selling.' 53
Briefly, then, the patent and copyright owner's rights are
based on statutory protection and for enforceability of these
rights the statute should be consulted, whereas in the trade
mark the owner must allege and show substantial damage
has resulted from an infringement.' 54 Thus, if the author
or inventor ever found himself in a situation where he could.
choose his protection among the trade mark, the patent, and
the copyright, it would seem that the greatest protection
would be afforded by the patent, copyright and trademark
in that order.
CONCLUSION
From a survey of the evolution of the rights granted to
the copyright owner, one is aware of the gradual extension
of the author's rights. This policy is in accord with the basic
purpose of the Copyright Act, namely to encourage and pro-
tect the creative genius of the individual.
151 Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U. S. 339, 52 L. ed. 1086, 28 S. Ct.
722 (1908).
152 Am. Cotton Tie Co. v. Simmons, 106 U. S. 89, 27 L. ed. 79, 1 S. Ct. 52
(1882).
153 Bauer v. O'Donnell, 229 U. S. 1, 57 L. ed. 1041 (1912).
154 Am, Fork and Hoe Co. v. Stampit Corp., 125 F. 2d 472 (1942).
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In the main, the common law copyright merely afforded
the author a monopoly over his product, only until it was
published. The framers of the Constitution of the United
States, realizing the limited scope of the common law pro-
tection, provided that Congress should have the power to in-
crease the protection of the authors as a means of encour-
aging men to produce more works of lasting merit for the
world.
Under this authority, Congress has seen fit to carry out
the intent of the framers of our United States Constitution
by enacting the Copyright Act. Under this Act, the author
or proprietor has gained the exclusive right to vend and mul-
tiply his product, to license another to use his product, to as-
sign his rights to another, to restrict the use by a valid con-
tract, to renew, and the right to protect their interests from
infringers. The courts have rather consistently construed
the Copyright Act in the spirit in which it was passed, for
the further protection of authors.
For many years the Copyright Act has served to foster the
interests of authors and proprietors. However, today there
would seem to be a need for an expansion of the scope of the
statutory protection for authors. For, with the growth of
commerce, communications, and transportation the world
has been brought closer to our front door, and the copyright
owner, naturally, desires protection for his property rights
when his produce enters the channels of world commerce. An
agreement whereby a uniform copyright statute could be in-
voked, at least, in the Western Hemisphere would serve fur-
ther to insure the author protection and encouragement of
his intellectual genius which is the basic purpose of our copy-
right protection.
James H. Neu.
